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Abstract
The distribution of indivisible good in a society has social implications on individual
behavior. In this paper, I present a model of choice which permit the quantification of the
sense of impartiality. This model has implication in the choice of a winner of an indivisible
good among a group of eligible individuals
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          A problem, central to economic theory is that of specifying the most desirable 
distribution of goods and services in an economy. The problem of distributional equity and 
any basic principle of distributive justice underlie the traditional normative economics. A 
difficulty with much of this work in this area has been that is ultimately involved 
interpersonal comparisons of utility (subjective evaluations of the utility that someone else 
derives from a particular state of economy).  Since Arrow’s impossibility theorem, a 
considerable literature refusing interpersonal comparisons has appeared over the last 23 years. 
The aim of this literature concerns the “envy-free” allocation (Foley (1967)) which is the 
concept that has played the central role, that is, an allocation such that nobody prefers what 
someone else receives to what he receive. A few alternative criteria are proposed and 
compared  to alternative approaches to no envy by Pazner and Schmeidler (1978) developed 
by Berliant, Dunz and Thomson (1992) namely “egalitarian equivalence”. According to these 
authors, an allocation is egalitarian equivalent if there is a “reference bundle” that each agent 
find indifferent to the bundle to receive. The central idea underlying egalitarian equivalence 
namely that an allocation can be meaningfully evaluated by reference to hypothetical 
economies, has been generalized in a number of ways. However, tests based on reference to 
hypothetical economies in which all agents access to the same choice s et have been 
formulated, leading to the notion “equal opportunity equivalence” (Thomson (1994) 
Fleurbaey (1995) Roemer (1996) and Bossert (1997)). The references to economies where all 
agent have the same preferences underlies the so called “identical preferences lower bound” 
or “identical preferences upper bound” varies on whether it gives a lower bound or a upper 
bound depends on the model, in particular whether public good are present; Moulin (1990) 
Bevia (1993, 1996). This last notion are meaningful in  non classical economies such as 
economies with indivisible goods  (Svensson (1983) Tadenuma and Thomson (1991)), 
economies with public goods, exchange production  and economies in which what has to be 
divided is non homogeneous (time, land etc.). In other hand, criteria on reference to the agent 
preference (Moulin and Sprumont (1998) “welfare domination under preference 
replacement”), economies in which all agent’s productivity are the same share also appeared 
(Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1999)). Other studies  concerns the fairness of process as opposed 
to that of end results, this literature address the issue of accommodating talent or handicap 
(Fleurbaey (1991)), consequences, opportunities, capability and procedures.  
       My present study seeks to develop the concept of impartiality as a measure of the 
distributional equity of allocations in private indivisible goods. I consider a society in which 
few individuals require kidney transplant and assume that only one kidney is available. I 
suppose that all claimers have the same relevant characteristics ( that is, they are the same 
age, have the same health status and have the similar family social responsibility, talent and 
compensation) and thus have equal claims to the goods. As Karni and Safra (2000) I beg the 
question of how the society ought to allocate the indivisible good according to individual’s 
claim on it?. Instead, the prevalent attitude in economics is to model individual behavior as 
motivated solely by material self-interest. Yet, there are many remarkably stable institutions 
whose existence and functioning seems inconsistent with this model of human behavior. 
Disregarding the possibilities of disposal of the indivisible good or compensation, I present an 
axiomatic model of self-interest seeking moral individuals. More specifically, I consider a 
theory of individual choice behavior among random allocation procedures incorporating 
impartiality. This study involves interpersonal comparisons of the utility, of course the very 
notion of impartiality and preferences are difficult to define and difficult philosophical issues 
may quickly arise. Harsanyi (1955), Kolm (1972), Ralws (1971) Dworkin (1981), Arneson 
(1989) among others point to different ways in which these notions can be defined for the purpose of a fair distribution of allocation. In this paper, I will not advocate a particular 
definition of fairness (versus impartiality), and simply assume that a separation between the 
individual characteristics that lie in the self-interest preference and the fairness preference. 
Then assuming that  such a separation is done, two main ethical principles seems to be at 
work. First the self-interest preference is inferred from individual actual choices whereas the 
fairness preference may be inferred from hypothetical choice among allocations procedure 
from behind a veil of ignorance. As Karni and Safra’s (2000), my approach to modeling takes 
the impartiality and the preferences relations as primitives and derives the self-interest 
relation. My approach in the paper is analogous to that used by Pratt (1964), Arrow (1965) 
and Kimball (1990) in the development of measures of risk aversion and prudence in the 
theory of individual making choice under risk. As in the theory of risk aversion and prudence, 
the measure of the intensity of the sense of impartiality involve two distinct steps. The first is 
to define the sense in which one individual may be considered to have a stronger sense of 
impartiality than another does. Next, the second step is to characterize this relation in terms of 
the properties of the corresponding utility function. At this stage other difficulty is to take 
account of the multidimensionality of the choice space and the possible disagreement of the 
ordinal preferences of the individuals being compared (see Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974), 
Duncan (1977), Ambarish and Kallberg (1987) and Chalfant and Finkelstein (1991)). The 
issues of the ordinal and cardinal comparability of the sense of impartiality are considered by 
restricting the comparisons to individuals who agree on the definition of impartiality and 
whose selfish preferences are ordinally comparable. Finally, I show that the measure of the 
intensity of the sentiment of impartiality have intuitive appealing behavioral characterizations. 
Possessing stronger sense of impartiality is equivalent to having a lower gap between the 
fairer allocation procedures choosing without risk and in the presence of uncertainty.  
In the next section I present the model, section 3 develop measure for interpersonal 
comparisons of additive utility of the sense of impartiality, then concluding remark appear in 
the end. 
 
2 THE MODEL. 
             I use the analytical framework and main results in Karni and Safra. A society 
consisting of  ( ) 2 , ,..., 1 ‡ = n n N  eligible individuals faces the need to allocate among its 
members one unit of indivisible goods. Denote by 
i e , the unit vector in 
n R , the ex post 
allocation in which the individual i is assigned the good. Let  { } n i e
i £ £ 1 /  be the set of ex 
post allocations and  ( ) X P D = , be the  ( ) 1 - n  dimensional simplex representing the set of all 
probability distribution on  X . P has the interpretation of the set of allocation procedures. 
Assumed that P is endowed with the 
1 - n R topology. Two transitive, complete and continuous 
binary relations on P represent an individual: the relation f, representing his actual choice of 
behavior. The empirical meaning of  f may be inferred from actual choice; it’s the classical 
relation used in most economic field. The relation of impartiality  I f , may be inferred from 
hypothetical choice among allocation procedures from behind of veil of ignorance or real 
choices among allocation procedures for a set of individuals which does not include the 
decision maker himself and among whose members he is impartial.  
 
3.1 UTILITY REPRESENTATIONS 
         As Karni and Safra (2000), I take the preference relation and the impartiality relation as 
primitive, and I derive the selfish motive implicit in the individual choice behavior. An 
allocation procedure p is preferred over another allocation procedure q from selfish point of 
view, if the two allocation procedures are equally fair and p is preferred over q. let  S f , denote the derived binary relation representing the self-interest component of the preference relation 
f. Consider a set of axioms (including quasi-concavity of  I f ) that is equivalent to the 
existence of an affine function 
            R P k ﬁ : , representing  S f  
a function 
             R Pﬁ : s , strictly quasi-concave on  P int representing the impartiality relation  I f , 
and a utility function  U , representing the preference relation  f that is a function of a self-
interest and the fairness representations. More specifically, we assumed the existence of a 
function  
           ( ) ( ) { } R P p p p k U ﬁ ˛ / , . : ' s  
such that for all allocation procedure  P q p ˛ , , 
          ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) q q k U p p k U q p s s , . ' , . ' ‡ ￿ f  
The function  ' U , is additively separable in the self-interest and impartiality components.  
Now assume that there are axioms that are equivalent to the existence of a monotonic 
increasing function/ 
           R R h ﬁ : , such that for all p, q  P ˛  
            ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) q q k h p p k h q p s s + ‡ + ￿ . . f  




k h  is another triple of functions  
corresponding to  I S and f f f,  as above then  . 0 , ~ ,
~ ~
> + = + = b c b and a k o h b hok s s  
 
3.2 INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS WITH ADDITIVE UTILITY 
          In this part, I study the meaning of the relation “possessing a stronger sense of 
impartiality”, develop alternative representations of this relation, and depict its behavioral 
characterization. Assuming that U is twice differentiable and  ' ' ' U  exists. In contrast of Karni 
and Safra, who only used the Pratt and Arrow measures of risk aversion, I add the notion of 
prudence. Indeed, although the notion of risk aversion is very rich, it’s not suitable for 
answering questions that depend on the effect of risk on marginal utility rather than total 
utility. My approach of impartiality is analogous to Kimball (1990) concept of prudence. This 
last notion offers an economic interpretation that is meant to suggest the propensity to prepare 
and forearm oneself in the face of uncertainty, in contrast to risk aversion which is how much 
one dislikes uncertainty and would turn away from uncertainty if one could. My approach to 
quantify the sense of impartiality is to measure the willingness to sacrifice one’s material 
interest to attaint fairer allocation procedures. A formal definition of impartiality is to define 
an impartiality-premium, which require an explicit consideration of the utility representation. 
In the sequel, I define the notion of impartiality premium in the context of the additive utility 
models and show that it constitutes a criterion of interpersonal comparison of the sense of 
impartiality. I define the most impartial agent ‘s as one who makes the lowest gap choice 
between situation without uncertainty and the others involving uncertainty. 
 
 
3.3 DEFINITION 1 AND NOTATIONS  
      Let the following sets for the preference relation  f: for each  ( ) { } p q P q p B P p f / , ˛ = ˛ ,  
( ) { } ( ) ( ) ( ) p W p B p I q p P q p W ˙ = ˛ = , / f . Similarly, I define  ( ) ( ) ( ) p I and p W p B I I I ,   for 
the impartiality relation  I f . For another pair of preference relation and impartiality relation 
( ) I f f ˆ , ˆ . I denote the corresponding sets by  ( ) ( ) p B p B I ˆ , ˆ  etc. The preference relation and 
impartiality relation( ) I f f, ,  ( ) I f f ˆ , ˆ  on P are said to be comparable if they incorporate the same idea of impartiality and the same view of what constitutes self-interest. Next, we assume 
that ( ) I f f, , ( ) I f f ˆ , ˆ  are said to be comparable if  ( ) I I f f = ˆ and ( ) S S f f ˆ = . 
 
DEFINITION 2 
   I admit analogous to Yaari’s (1969) definition of the partial ordering “totally more risk 
averse than” in the theory of decision making under risk. Let the preference-impartiality 
relations  ( ) I f f, , ( ) I f f ˆ , ˆ  be comparable, then the preference-impartiality relation  ( ) I f f,  is 
said to possess a stronger sense of impartiality than  ( ) I f f ˆ , ˆ  if, for every allocation procedure 
P p ˛   
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) p W p B p A p W p B p A I I ˆ ˆ ˆ ˙ = ˝ ˙ = . For comparable preference impartiality 
relations, I assume that one preference relation as displaying a stronger sense of impartiality 
than another if, given any allocation procedure p, every other allocation procedure that is less 
fair than p and is acceptable to the former is acceptable to the latter. 
 
3.4 IMPARTIALITY-PREMIUM 
          Assume that ( ) I f f,  and  ( ) I f f ˆ , ˆ  be comparable preference-impartiality relations with 




k h  respectively. Comparability means that there 
exist monotonic increasing functions  g and f  satisfying  s s go and fog h = = ˆ ˆ .     To define 
the impartiality in this model, I fix an initial allocation p and suppose that is perturbed by a 
variation  v. Let  ( )
n R p E ￿ , be the set of variation  v satisfying  P v p ˛ + . I define the 
impartiality-premium y , as satisfying: 
                   ( ) ( ) { } R p E v and R p v p
n ﬁ ˛ ˛ / , : y , 
and for which the preference-impartiality relations ( ) I f f, , y  verifies the relation: 
                  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) v p v p k h p v p v p k h + ￿ + + = ￿ + - + s s y . ' , . '  
 
3.5 THE CONCEPT OF IMPARTIALITY AND IT’S RELATIONSHIP WITH  
       FAIRNESS. 
        Consider the Karni and Safra’s fairness-premium function  
                          ( ) ( ) { } R p E v and R p v p
n ﬁ ˛ ˛ / , : p  
and for which the preference-fairness relation  ( ) F f f, , is defined by 
                       ( ) ( ) q k v p k v p . . , - + = p  
and they assume that  
                         ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) v p v p k h p v p v p k h + + + = + - + s s p . , .   
before proceeding, I there exists a connected path  (.) p satisfying  ( ) p p = 0  and  ( ) q p = 1 , for all 
[ ] 1 , 0 ˛ b  we have: 
                       ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) v p v p k h p v p v p k h + + + = + - + b s b b s b p b . , .       (3.1) 
Now, differentiate (3.1) with respect to  ( ) b p , and using the impartiality definition,  I obtain 
                               
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )













k v p v p k h
￿ ￿ + - +








- ￿ - +
    in fact, it’s easy to show by the above equality that                        
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) v p v p k h
p
v p
k v p v p k h , . '
,
, . ' b y b
b
b p








- ￿ - +
 
from p is closely related to  y  by the equality: 
                           
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
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b p b y
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v p
k if v p v p
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v p
k if v p v p
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v p




   An allocation procedure q is a path-utility increasing reduction in impartiality relative to p 
given  ( ) s , ,k h  if there exists a connected path  (.) p satisfying  ( ) p p = 0  and  ( ) q p = 1 , for all 
[ ] 1 , 0 ˛ b  we have: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) 0 ' ' '
0 ' ' ' ' . . ' '
£ ￿
‡ ￿ + ￿
b b b s
b b b s b b b
d p p
and




Let  ( ) I f f,  and  ( ) I f f ˆ , ˆ  be comparable preference-impartiality relation with corresponding 




k h  respectively. Suppose that the functions  g and f  defined by 
s s go and fog h = = ˆ ˆ  satisfy for every p;  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) p g p k h f s ' ' . ' ' ‡ . If q is a path-utility 
increasing reduction in impartiality relative to p given  ( ) s , ,k h  then it’s utility increasing 




k h . 
Proof 
Let q be a path-utility increasing reduction in impartiality relative to p given  ( ) s , ,k h  and let 
() b d p .  is an infinitesimal utility increasing reduction in impartiality relative to  ( ) b p  given  
( ) s , ,k h . Then invoking the fundamental theorem of calculus, I have: 
 
                      ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ]= + - + p p k h q q k h
' ' ' ' ˆ . ˆ ˆ . ˆ s s   
               
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) b b s b s b b
b b s b s b b
' ' . '. . '
' ' . '. . '
p p p g k p k h p k h f
q q q g k q k h q k h f
￿ ￿ +
- ￿ ￿ +
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) b b b s b s b b
b b b s b s
b b b s b s b b b b
d p p p g k p k h p k h f
d p p p g
d p p p g k p k h p k h f k p k h p k h f
' ' ' . ' . '
' ' ' '











+ ￿ + ￿ + + =
   
rearranging the terms I have 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
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p g
k p k h p k h f
d p p
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p g
k p k h p k h f
d p p k p k h
p g














































collecting the results, one obtains: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] [ ] ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) C d p p k p k h p k h f
B d p p k p k h p k h f
A d p p k p k h p g
b b b s b b
b b b s b b
b b b s b b s
' ' . ' . '
' ' ' . '. ' . '













+ ￿ ￿ + £
 
This last inequality follows from  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) C p g and B for p g p k h f A for p k h f p g 0 ' ' . ' , . ' ' ' ' > ‡ ‡ b s b s b b b s  
Finally  it’s easy to see that  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] [ ] ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) 0 ' ' . ' . '
' ' ' . '. ' . '











£ ￿ ￿ +
+ ￿ +
+ ￿ ￿ +
b b b s b b
b b b s b b
b b b s b b s
d p p k p k h p k h f
d p p k p k h p k h f




              ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] 0 ˆ . ˆ ˆ . ˆ ' ' ' ' £ + - + p p k h q q k h s s  
  
CONCLUSION 
     In this paper I presented an axiomatic model of choice depicting the choice behavior. The 
behavior is representable by an utility function that decomposes into linear function 
representing the material self-interest and a function representing the individual sense of 
impartiality. Without regarding particular definition of impartiality or fairness  I propose in 
analogy with prudence, an impartiality-premium which involves a choice of the path in the 
space of allocation procedure. To choose the winner, impartial society or the decision-maker 
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